Sign requests
  Last reviewed:  about 1 year ago  
Verify a signed request using the HMAC and SHA-256 algorithms or return a 403.
You can both verify and generate signed requests from within a Worker using the Web Crypto APIs ↗.
The following Worker will:
- 
For request URLs beginning with /generate/, replace/generate/with/, sign the resulting path with its timestamp, and return the full, signed URL in the response body.
- 
For all other request URLs, verify the signed URL and allow the request through. 
import { Buffer } from "node:buffer";
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
// How long an HMAC token should be valid for, in secondsconst EXPIRY = 60;
export default {  /**   *   * @param {Request} request   * @param {{SECRET_DATA: string}} env   * @returns   */  async fetch(request, env) {    // You will need some secret data to use as a symmetric key. This should be    // attached to your Worker as an encrypted secret.    // Refer to https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/configuration/secrets/    const secretKeyData = encoder.encode(      env.SECRET_DATA ?? "my secret symmetric key",    );
    // Import your secret as a CryptoKey for both 'sign' and 'verify' operations    const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(      "raw",      secretKeyData,      { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },      false,      ["sign", "verify"],    );
    const url = new URL(request.url);
    // This is a demonstration Worker that allows unauthenticated access to /generate    // In a real application you would want to make sure that    // users could only generate signed URLs when authenticated    if (url.pathname.startsWith("/generate/")) {      url.pathname = url.pathname.replace("/generate/", "/");
      const timestamp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
      // This contains all the data about the request that you want to be able to verify      // Here we only sign the timestamp and the pathname, but often you will want to      // include more data (for instance, the URL hostname or query parameters)      const dataToAuthenticate = `${url.pathname}${timestamp}`;
      const mac = await crypto.subtle.sign(        "HMAC",        key,        encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate),      );
      // Refer to https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/runtime-apis/nodejs/      // for more details on using Node.js APIs in Workers      const base64Mac = Buffer.from(mac).toString("base64");
      url.searchParams.set("verify", `${timestamp}-${base64Mac}`);
      return new Response(`${url.pathname}${url.search}`);      // Verify all non /generate requests    } else {      // Make sure you have the minimum necessary query parameters.      if (!url.searchParams.has("verify")) {        return new Response("Missing query parameter", { status: 403 });      }
      const [timestamp, hmac] = url.searchParams.get("verify").split("-");
      const assertedTimestamp = Number(timestamp);
      const dataToAuthenticate = `${url.pathname}${assertedTimestamp}`;
      const receivedMac = Buffer.from(hmac, "base64");
      // Use crypto.subtle.verify() to guard against timing attacks. Since HMACs use      // symmetric keys, you could implement this by calling crypto.subtle.sign() and      // then doing a string comparison -- this is insecure, as string comparisons      // bail out on the first mismatch, which leaks information to potential      // attackers.      const verified = await crypto.subtle.verify(        "HMAC",        key,        receivedMac,        encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate),      );
      if (!verified) {        return new Response("Invalid MAC", { status: 403 });      }
      // Signed requests expire after one minute. Note that this value should depend on your specific use case      if (Date.now() / 1000 > assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) {        return new Response(          `URL expired at ${new Date((assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) * 1000)}`,          { status: 403 },        );      }    }
    return fetch(new URL(url.pathname, "https://example.com"), request);  },};import { Buffer } from "node:buffer";
const encoder = new TextEncoder();
// How long an HMAC token should be valid for, in secondsconst EXPIRY = 60;
interface Env {  SECRET_DATA: string;}export default {  async fetch(request, env): Promise<Response> {    // You will need some secret data to use as a symmetric key. This should be    // attached to your Worker as an encrypted secret.    // Refer to https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/configuration/secrets/    const secretKeyData = encoder.encode(      env.SECRET_DATA ?? "my secret symmetric key",    );
    // Import your secret as a CryptoKey for both 'sign' and 'verify' operations    const key = await crypto.subtle.importKey(      "raw",      secretKeyData,      { name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },      false,      ["sign", "verify"],    );
    const url = new URL(request.url);
    // This is a demonstration Worker that allows unauthenticated access to /generate    // In a real application you would want to make sure that    // users could only generate signed URLs when authenticated    if (url.pathname.startsWith("/generate/")) {      url.pathname = url.pathname.replace("/generate/", "/");
      const timestamp = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000);
      // This contains all the data about the request that you want to be able to verify      // Here we only sign the timestamp and the pathname, but often you will want to      // include more data (for instance, the URL hostname or query parameters)      const dataToAuthenticate = `${url.pathname}${timestamp}`;
      const mac = await crypto.subtle.sign(        "HMAC",        key,        encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate),      );
      // Refer to https://developers.cloudflare.com/workers/runtime-apis/nodejs/      // for more details on using NodeJS APIs in Workers      const base64Mac = Buffer.from(mac).toString("base64");
      url.searchParams.set("verify", `${timestamp}-${base64Mac}`);
      return new Response(`${url.pathname}${url.search}`);      // Verify all non /generate requests    } else {      // Make sure you have the minimum necessary query parameters.      if (!url.searchParams.has("verify")) {        return new Response("Missing query parameter", { status: 403 });      }
      const [timestamp, hmac] = url.searchParams.get("verify").split("-");
      const assertedTimestamp = Number(timestamp);
      const dataToAuthenticate = `${url.pathname}${assertedTimestamp}`;
      const receivedMac = Buffer.from(hmac, "base64");
      // Use crypto.subtle.verify() to guard against timing attacks. Since HMACs use      // symmetric keys, you could implement this by calling crypto.subtle.sign() and      // then doing a string comparison -- this is insecure, as string comparisons      // bail out on the first mismatch, which leaks information to potential      // attackers.      const verified = await crypto.subtle.verify(        "HMAC",        key,        receivedMac,        encoder.encode(dataToAuthenticate),      );
      if (!verified) {        return new Response("Invalid MAC", { status: 403 });      }
      // Signed requests expire after one minute. Note that this value should depend on your specific use case      if (Date.now() / 1000 > assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) {        return new Response(          `URL expired at ${new Date((assertedTimestamp + EXPIRY) * 1000)}`,          { status: 403 },        );      }    }
    return fetch(new URL(url.pathname, "https://example.com"), request);  },} satisfies ExportedHandler<Env>;The provided example code for signing requests is compatible with the is_timed_hmac_valid_v0() Rules language function. This means that you can verify requests signed by the Worker script using a WAF custom rule.